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ABSTRACT 
We use several numerical tests in order to receive answers to our 
three questions. First, this paper aims to indicate, which measure 
of central bank independence explains economic changes the most 
accurately, and hence gives the most exact guidance onto 
institutional design of monetary authorities. Second, our aim is to 
prove that differences in legal proxies matter as much as 
institutional development of countries. Finally, we show that 
results are vulnerable to data modification. This experiment is 
performed by an empirical verification of the quality of CBI 
indices, comparing several widely used measures for around 100 
countries, using a panel data approach. After a brief description of 
imprecision in CBI measures methodology and their definitions, a 
comparison using OLS method is made. Additional tests of TSLS, 
PCA and stepwise selection are used, as well. In the final 
conclusion we are able to point the “winner” of this experiment 
but also we indicate that a minor modification of data can change 
the result. 
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Early studies on central bank and its relations with the government and the
public gave strict directions for central bankers: price stability as the goal
and high personal independence, which eﬀected with the ﬂow of new cen-
tral bank laws. Empirical studies, so often contradictory to each other, ﬁrst
brought the evidence for the CBI-inﬂation relation, only to criticize it later
on. The central bank independence (CBI) measuring problem, compared by
some to the discussion on the accuracy of openness deﬁnitions, is not sim-
ple. In both cases, the choice of deﬁnitions may inﬂuence empirical results.
Deﬁning the openness does not mean, however, inﬂuencing the institutions
directly. It is otherwise in the case of CB independence, where the choice
of central banks’ attributes has the direct eﬀect on the institutional design
of central banks. The measure, constructed by a researcher, becomes the
deﬁnition itself and can imply how the central bank law will be designed.
Running hundreds of regressions, while researching the topic on relations
between central bank independence and inﬂation, brought us to an inter-
esting conclusion that central bank independence may work as a placebo.
Economists agree it is needed as one of the major instrument in achieving
price stability but there is not a single study that would prove lower inﬂation
is caused by CBI.
Moreover, despite many attempts, independence appears to be an un-
quantiﬁable phenomenon. We ask ourselves a question: what do these CBI
measures really mean. First of all, the theoretical analysis of the true state of
CBs showed that most of values do not represent the reality.1 It is, perhaps,
possible to believe that the National Bank of Poland is as independent as the
European Central Bank (the former had adjusted its legal status prior the
EU membership). We ﬁnd diﬃcult to trust in results stating that the Cen-
tral Bank of Belarus is more independent than the Fed or Bank of England
(according to the legal measure constructed by Cukierman, 1992).
After many critical studies on CBI, and having problems to receive any
consistent results from empirical analysis, we have started to wonder, why
so many countries decided to increase their degree of monetary authority’s
autonomy. The standard answer so far was to bring an example of the
Bundesbank, its institutional design and successful period of disinﬂation
since the World War II to the present day. However, due to the lack of
causality, we ask again, do we really need central bank independence.
Despite problems with quantifying this institution, we believe that the
basic, and perhaps the most accurate deﬁnition of CBI, provided by Debelle
and Fischer (1994), justiﬁes the need for CBI. Central banks need to be able
to choose their monetary goals autonomously and fulﬁll these targets with
1Fo the critical analysis of this topic see A. Maslowska,“Discussion on the Inconsistency
of Central Bank Independence Measures”, ACE Discussion Paper, No. 21, 2007.
1the use of independently chosen instruments. Moreover, higher degree of
CBI helps to improve degree of transparency and therefore helps to reveal
“Secrets of the Temple” to the public.
The objective of this paper is to ﬁnd the best among measures of CBI. We
decide to perform empirical tests checking each measure’s ability to explain
changes in inﬂation. We are doing so keeping in mind that each institu-
tional improvement of central banks always aims to obtain more eﬃcient
monetary policy. Thus, along with other studies, we assume that the main,
and perhaps the only, reason of introducing higher degree of central bank
independence is to help achieving price stability.
We have entitled this paper ”Quest for the best” giving a hint, we are
expecting to point the winner of this ”competition”that is the most accurate
measure. We perform several tests, some more, other less suitable (we are
aware that all are vulnerable for criticism). First, we place all CBI measures
in the test they were constructed for: analysis for inverse relation with inﬂa-
tion. We do not give a profound explanation, why such an association should
exist. For there has been many studies, which presents theoretical explana-
tion.2 We simply verify their ability of explaining changes in inﬂation the
way their authors aimed to do so while constructing their deﬁnitions. Our
advantage lays in a fact that we have gathered several measures altogether
and put them in one test. We have also longer time series and knowledge of
results vulnerability based on bivariate examinations.
Second, we refer to other methods that is a principal component analysis
and regression based on a stepwise selection. We keep in mind the contri-
bution made by Banaian, Burdekin and Willet (1998), who performed a
PCA for a legal measure LVAU. We also remember that a stepwise selection
attracts critical attention.
With this paper, we also want to challenge Cukierman’s (1992, p. 425)
conclusion that“any divergences in results between our full sample and that
of the ATC [Alesina, and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini studies] is due
to diﬀerences in institutional features across the samples of countries rather
than to diﬀerences in the legal proxies of CB independence”. With this
paper we want to show that measures can give contradictory results also
within one sample. We are doing so by: (1) having a larger sample of le-
gal measures used in a comparison that helps to analyze their construction
in a broader way; (2) focusing on each group of countries separately; (3)
and ﬁnally underlining that turnover of governors had been named the mea-
sure of “actual” independence and hence could be excluded from the study.
However, we want to underline, we agree with Cukierman that institutional
development of countries matters.
Furthermore, we also ask ourselves, if the idea of quantifying something
that seems unquantiﬁable makes sense. Our aim is not to diminish the im-
2Some references in the text.
2portance of previous studies, for we acknowledge all courageous attempts
of quantifying this phenomenon. We simply want to hint an idea that sev-
eral other institutional solutions, inﬂation targeting for example, carry some
elements of CBI as well.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief theoretical
background covering simple justiﬁcation for central bank independence. We
also show facts, which many other studies have pointed out: inconsistencies
in constructions, and empirical investigation of CBI measures. We collect
some of the strongest arguments against building indices the way they are
now, and add our new inputs to this case. This illustration justiﬁes further
studies in this area. The description of the model and methodology can be
found in section 3 of this paper, which is followed with results and comments
(section 4). Additional information concerning CBI measures, as well as
detailed estimation results are placed in Appendices.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 On the way to stable prices
Over the past 15 years, global inﬂation has dropped from 30% to 3%3. Has
it been the result of eﬀective monetary policy? Have central banks received
any special incentive for working successfully? Both literature and experi-
ence give several explanations of this phenomenon, institutional changes and
focus on independent monetary authority being one of them.
In order to explain decreasing trend of inﬂation, it is necessary to em-
phasize presence of many factors. Rogoﬀ (2003) underlines importance of
increased level of competitiveness, deregulation and a decreased role of gov-
ernments in many economies. Surely, tighter ﬁscal policy played an impor-
tant role as well. In European countries the drive towards common currency
input discipline in many areas speciﬁed by the Maastricht Treaty.
An important post-Keynesian development in macroeconomics is the
inﬂuence of the new classical economics: the rational expectations model
proposed by Robert Lucas. According to rational expectations hypothesis,
economic agents make rational expectations based on all available infor-
mation to make best possible forecasts. As long as the government holds
control over ﬁscal and monetary policies and supports expansionary pol-
icy with large deﬁcits and increased money growth, rational agents would
expect higher rates of inﬂation in the future. Hence, the delegation of mon-
etary responsibilities to a central bank, which deﬁnes his inﬂation-aversion
and obtains certain degree of independence sends information to agents. A
case study on the relation between inﬂation expectations and institutional
changes for Great Britan, performed by Spiegel (1998), provides the result
3Based on data and projections of IMF’s World Economic Outlook
3that market perceived that enhanced CBI (announcement - May 6, 1997)
would lead to lower average rates of future inﬂation. Despite the lack of
proof for causality, Spiegel summarizes that announcements of institutional
changes matter and in this case it has a signiﬁcant impact on future expected
inﬂation rates.
Further going in this line, the most prominent argument for central bank
independence is the time-inconsistency problem, suggested by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), developed later by Barro and Gordon (1983). Despite the
asymmetry of information, private sector understands determinants of gov-
ernment policy and formulates its expectations based on this knowledge.
However, a government that will attempt to re-optimize and change its plan
later will suﬀer from a credibility problem.
2.2 On CBI deﬁnitions’ imprecision
In this following section, we present brief summaries of empirical results on
relationship between central bank independence and inﬂation, and we add
our contribution into discussion on proxies of CBI imprecisions.
2.2.1 Short results reminder of major studies on CBI
Political and economy independence Without any doubt, one of the
major contributions in area of measuring CBI have been prepared by Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Their work, for the ﬁrst time, named
in details institutional attributes of central bank autonomy, distinguishing
between political aspects of this deﬁnition and economic ones. Degree of
CBI has been calculated at the moment of the study (assumed year 1989),
however this numerical representation is based on the data from the IMF
monograph on central bank legislation, created in 1967, and national legis-
lation.
Empirical examination relies on using the same value of CBI in the period
1950-1989, which is divided into 4 decades. The results show the eﬀect of
indicators (political and economic) on cross-country diﬀerences in inﬂation
rates. As explanatory variables, authors have included participation in the
EMS, as well as variables carrying political characteristics: (1) frequency
(number of government changes for the decade); (2) signiﬁcant (number of
”signiﬁcant” government changes for the decade); and (3) majority. Major
ﬁndings, regression coeﬃcients for decades and the whole period, show the
expected (negative) sign for the indicator of central bank independence,
with diﬀerent signiﬁcance depending on the type of autonomy and the level
of average inﬂation in decades. The CBI measures also proved to be more
signiﬁcant in explaining degrees of inﬂation than political variables. Hence,
all in all, measures constructed by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini were
able to prove negative relation between CBI and inﬂation.
4The most widely used indicators The work performed simultanously
to GMT, done by Cukierman (1992)4, revolutionized the study on CBI. The
author not only underlined the possibility of existing diﬀerences between the
legal and actual degree of autonomy, but also created a detailed measure for
a much larger sample of countries, giving this way material that has been
often used in subsequent literature.
Cukierman’s contribution emerged in creating a legal indicator LVAU
(LVAW), measure of the ”actual” independence TOR, as well as an index
based on the questionnaire sent to central bankers, QVAU. Later, his further
work on actual independence resulted with another measure, vulnerability
(VUL), capturing aspects of government-CB governor instability (Cukier-
mand and Webb, 1995). Furthermore, on contrary to GMT, Cukierman
calculated a value of CBI for each period separately. Considering that the
period of analysis is similar as in GMT, 1950-1989, each measure has 4 dif-
ferent values for each decade, and the value depends on actual changes in
central banks’ legal statutes or frequency of governor changes within the
subperiod.
The regression of inﬂation on the legal variables after the ﬁrst aggregation
shows insigniﬁcant results for the whole sample (developed and less develop-
ing countries). The individual contribution of each legal variable is mostly
(not always) negative, hence as expected, and increases while including TOR
to the regression; however, this eﬀect is again not always signiﬁcant. Divid-
ing the sample into two groups dependent on development did not help to
increase signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients. Measure of actual independence, TOR,
is positive5 and signiﬁcant for the whole period, for less developed countries,
whereas it has a negative sign for developed ones.
Resulted from second aggregation, one measure of legal independence,
proves to show signiﬁcant and expected results only for developed countries.
Cukierman summarizes it indicating that measures of legal autonomy may
be more adequate for developed countries.
2.2.2 Robustness of autonomy measures
Studies on the relationship between inﬂation and central bank independence
brought a justiﬁcation for the institutional change of central banks. They
also started to ask questions concerning the substance of the CBI deﬁnition.
Its construction and precision rely on proper understanding of CB laws and
status, knowledge of a researcher, or how detailed CB attributes are being
included in the measure. Thus, how ‘independent’ a central bank becomes
does not only depend on its institutional design but also on researchers’
4And Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992)
5It is often wrongly analized that the negative sign of coeﬃcients is also expected for
TOR. It is important to remind after Cukierman that in case of this measure, higher
values indicate lower independence, on contrary to the legal measure.
5arbitrariness. According to Eijﬃnger and Schaling (1993) three types of
subjective choice are involved while constructing CBI index: (1) which cri-
teria should be included; (2) how should the legislation be interpreted, and
(3) what weight should be attributed to each criterion.
The most common method, the ‘statutes and law’ reading, is criticized
by Forder (2000), who names several ‘traps’. He guesses, the designers of
statute-reading measures postulate an opinion that a central bank always
sets what they believe to be the best policy once given the power to do
so. Similar opinion presents Woolley (1994) who remarks a lack of interest
presented by measures in an area that should be of central importance, that
is, whether, independent central banks actually are able to act contrary to
the government wishes. As a comment, Forder (2000) brings an argument
that the true power of an institution is determined rather by the actual
practice in enforcing own decisions than the formal rules and ‘the surface
appearance’.
Considering the fact that Cukierman (1992) is focusing on ‘legal’ inde-
pendence as opposite to ‘actual’ and tests done by Banaian et al. (1998)
proving insigniﬁcance of Cukierman choice of attributes, index of ‘legal’ cen-
tral bank independence seems to be informative only in a limited area. Ba-
naian et al. (1995), although acknowledge the contribution of Cukierman’s
indices, argue it is not suﬃcient to read central bank laws on the ﬁnancial
relationship between central bank and government. Such a method is not
explaining the pressures on central banks when open market operations are
concerned. Further, authors continue, the turnover rate reveals little infor-
mation about government inﬂuence on central banks, and what eﬀect the
degree of TOR will have on inﬂation in industrial countries. Moreover, it is
possible, that a low degree of turnover means no more but an ‘accommoda-
tive’ governor, who is unlikely to be replaced.
A collection of CB characteristics included in the measure is a decision
aiming to choose the most important attributes, in respect of the general CBI
deﬁnition. Eijﬃnger and Schaling (1993) decide to call a ’decisive’ attribute
the one concerning ﬁnal policy authority. It results with asymmetry in favour
of this matter, giving lower importance to questions concerning the presence
of a government oﬃcial in the board or the board appointments procedure.
Similarly, Banaian et al. (1995, 1998) argue, that basic theoretical princi-
ples contribute the priority to attributes concerning the formal ability of the
central bank to set monetary policy autonomously. Hence, they assign lesser
importance to the central bank as an interventionist in the market for gov-
ernment securities. All attributes, including the procedure of appointment
or ﬁnancial relationship with government are informative when the political
pressure placed on monetary authorities is concerned. However, “where the
government makes the basic policy decisions and the role of the central bank
is limited to simply implementing the government’s instructions, the eﬀects
of these other attributes are likely to be severely compromised”(Banaian et
6Table 1: Subjectivity and arbitrariness of selected CBI attributes
Attribute Cukierman Maliszewski Loungani Rank (Fry et al.)
(based on GMT) and Sheets
CEO 20 31.25 46 2
Policy Formulation 30 37.5 38.5 1
Lending Restrictions 50 31.25 15.5 3
Notes: Values for three ﬁrst measures represent the percentage of focus put on certain
attribute compared to the total number of CB factors.
Based on the data from: Cukierman, A. (1992), Maliszewski W. (2000), Loungani, P.
and N. Sheets, (1997).
al., 1998).
Further, it is possible that CBI measures simply do not consider the
amount of disagreement that has arisen as to the relative importance of
the diﬀerent institutional features that may be signiﬁcant for central bank
independence. Table 1 presents a comparison between three measures:
Cukierman’s ‘legal index’ (1992), modiﬁcation of the Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini index (GMT hereafter) done by Maliszewski (2000) and index con-
structed by Loungani and Sheets (1997) especially for transition economies.
Numbers in relating to these measures columns represent the percentage
share of the total number of CB attributes in the measure. For example,
Cukierman focuses in 50% on lending restrictions, when Maliszewski (GMT)
spreads his interest almost equally into three clusters of attributes. The last
column shows rankings according to central bankers, who were asked to
name the most and least important central bank attribute, when CB inde-
pendence is concerned.
A list of detailed CB attributes can be found in table 3 in Appendix. This
composition presents additionally, which attribute has been included in the
construction of chosen measures. Again, last column represents subjective
opinion of bankers, who indicate the importance of CBI elements.
3 Empirical examination of models
Keeping in mind theoretical justiﬁcation for CBI, previous studies proving
a negative relation between autonomy and inﬂation, as well as critical ex-
amination of CBI measures, we have decided to perform an empirical study
verifying which CBI deﬁnition among many has a capability of explaining
changes in inﬂation the most. We have collected the data on CBI from their
original studies. Below, we present a description of data, models and results.
3.1 Selection of country samples
Our major intention has been to include to the analysis as many countries
as possible, in order to be able for a profound comparison between various
7groups of economies. Hence, we have collected the data for the following
groups of countries (size of samples in brackets): industrialized countries
(23); emerging economies (19); transition economies (21); developing coun-
tries (62). In total, we have gathered the data for 126 countries. The missing
countries, for example for developing ones, are due to the lack of data for
central bank independence measures.
3.2 Data
CBI measures The literature presents several measures of central bank
independence; many of them consider legal aspects of independence, others
measure the“actual”degree of CB autonomy. The most interesting, however,
are those bringing new deﬁnitions of CBI and covering large samples in their
empirical veriﬁcation. A list of indices, which were picked according to these
criteria, and their brief presentation can be found in Appendix.6
Another topic, concentrating interests of many, is the presence (or the
absence) of robustness in empirical studies on the researched relation. Simple
bivariate models have been criticized of the biased results, while multivariate
ones started to prove insigniﬁcant or no relation between CBI and inﬂation.
This study tries to avoid accusations of too simple models by the choice of
other control variables.
The intuition behind author’s choice of CBI indices lays mainly in the
methodological explanation. Firstly, most of them are very often used by
many researchers in their analysis of macroeconomic relations. Some criti-
cal points concerning these measures may remain unnoticed for them, hence
this paper will act as a summarize and econometrical proof. Secondly, the
technique used in their construction is diﬀerent, other aspects of CB indepen-
dence were chosen and diﬀerent were underlined. Thirdly, the origins of this
choice lay in the scarcity of indices for certain groups of countries. Problems
with obtaining trustworthy information, political turnovers or other insta-
bilities caused smaller variety of indices calculated for developing countries.
On the other hand, the same reasons led many to recalculate existing mea-
sures and give new values. Some measures have been uniﬁed and connected
by the deﬁnition. Hence, there is no measure calculated by Arnone et al.
(2006) but their work is used as the update for the GMT. Similarly, the
author used values of TOR calculated by few (despite small diﬀerences in
values) to build a long data set for this index. All sources of data have been
acknowledged and included in the references.
Other explanatory variables The choice of explanatory variables de-
pends on samples (on special characteristics of each sample), the length of
6For a recent larger discussion on the types of CBI measures see e.g. “The Measurement
of Central Bank Autonomy: Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence”, M.
Arnone, B.J: Laurens, and J-F Segalotto, IMF Working Paper, 2006
8series available and adequacy to the problem. Originally, we have tried to
build similar models for all countries, since it would help us to compare fu-
ture results. Later, however, we have decided to choose explanatory variables
from many we have collected based on regressions’ diagnostics, to achieve
the best models. The full list of independent variables we have considered
can be found in the Appendix, and the ﬁnal choice can be read from result
tables.
Dependent variable Deﬁning a dependent variable may cause as many
problems as ﬁnding suitable collection of explanatory ones. First empirical
studies, and some currently, use the average annual inﬂation rate as the de-
pendent variable, others introduce diﬀerent deﬁnitions. Cukierman chooses
to use a depreciation in the real value of money, d =
inflationi,t
1+inflationi,t. He claims,
several explanations stand for doing so; ﬁrst, it better represents the real
losses on holding of money balances; and second, it moderates the eﬀect of
outliers with very high levels of inﬂation.
Our main dependent variable is the annual percentage change of the
consumer price index. We ﬁnd it ﬁts better to the data than mentioned
above depreciation in the real value money. In previous versions of this
paper, we have also tried to use a percentage change in inﬂation rate to
eliminate large diﬀerences in inﬂation values. We have kept it for discussion
in a part relating to developing countries.
3.2.1 Sources and frequency
While collecting the data, we have tried to refer to the one common source
for the whole sample, and hence, most of the data have been downloaded
from the International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database
web-pages, as well as Penn World Tables. Additional help, including more
detailed description of the data, has been reached from the printed version
of the same source.
We have decided to introduce variables concentrating on the democracy
or conﬂict description in some countries (e.g. developing). For the variables
describing conﬂict we have used Databanks International. Banks Cross-
National Time-Series Data Archive.7. Data on political instability have
been found in: Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groﬀ, P. Keefer and P. Walsh, 1999,
New tools and new tests in comparative political economy: The Database of
Political Institutions, July 1999. Additionally, we have decided to control
for the oil price, especially in emerging and developing countries. The source
of the data on crude oil prices has been found at the Energy Information
Administration (Oﬃcial Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government).8
7 Available from Trinity College Web site, http://timeseries.trincoll.edu/
8http: //www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/fsheets/real prices.html
9An important feature of the legislation process is that it is changed rather
infrequently, once for several years. This quality determines the frequency
of our data, which is annual. The longest series can be found for advanced
countries (1970 - 2006), the shortest for transition ones (1990 - 2006). We
identiﬁed years of signiﬁcant change in CBI-related legislation in each coun-
try. Subsequently, we have assumed that the value of CBI for a country
will be the same between the ﬁrst and the following amendment of the legal
statues. Since this assumption introduces measurement error, we have also
performed the analysis for the decennial division of periods (or, as in case
of transition economies, we have chosen the most important legislation year
for most of countries, as the time-series divider), relating to original studies.
3.3 The model and comparison
The ongoing economic division among countries leads to some implications
in the theoretical and empirical studies. Series of regression has been run
separately for advanced and nonindustrial countries. Due to several time-
series periods and the changing cross-section sample, panel data approach
has been used as an econometric method. Regressions are run with the OLS
method (mainly), corrected for White period. Samples are divided according
to the IMF classiﬁcation (as for October 2007).
3.3.1 Analysis of correlation
Firstly, the analysis of correlation is performed to ﬁnd how close, in their
values, CBI measures are. Table 4 in the Appendix presents ﬁrst comparison
results reporting correlation coeﬃcients for advanced countries.9 For all
samples, due to the character of TOR and PROB measures, the correlation
sign is expected to be negative; higher value of the legal independence should
correspond with lower turnover rate of governors.
Clearly, most of legal measures are highly correlated with each other. We
would have expected however larger number of signiﬁcant results keeping in
mind that all indices try to quantify the same phenomenon.
3.3.2 Estimation results
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, we have performed probably
hundreds of regressions, which were supposed to lead us to answers on the
”best of the best”measures of CBI. We have also built regressions diﬀerently,
using many explanatory variables chosen by us, and suggested by readers of
previous versions of this study.10 For samples, which could be characterized
9We have also found correlation coeﬃcients for other samples. We do not report all of
them simply because the correlation patterns repeat.
10The full list of variables can be found in the Appendix.
10with larger number of CBi measures, that is advanced and transition coun-
tries, we have decided to use the Principal Component Analysis to extract
essential factors. Later we use these factors as regressors, instead of original
indices, and observe their explanatory power.
We include a description of our results for each sample. Later, in the con-
cluding section, we summarize them and systemize according to our major
research questions mentioned in the introduction.
Industrial countries First studies on CBI focused mainly on the group
of advanced countries. There was probably several reasons but easier access
to the reliable data could be mentioned as the one. It resulted with a large
(more than 10 original deﬁnitions) number of CBI measures. We tried to
capture all of them, and did not include those, which were built based on
some statistical modiﬁcations of previous studies (like Alesina and Summers
”average” index).
The ﬁnal version of the model resulted from many substitutions, assump-
tions of including both macroeconomic variables and political one, as well as
based on model’s ﬁt. First, we use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regres-
sion method (corrected for White period), similarly to other studies. Later,
we have tried to perform Two-Stage Least Square (TSLS), to avoid problems
of not fulﬁlling the OLS criteria by the regression. Despite original idea of
estimating basic bivariate models, we have decided not to repeat the error
made by some previous studies. It is true that bivariate models bring little
informative value. Therefore, we have estimated multivariate models, re-
sults of which we extensively report in the text and in the Appendix.11From
the correlations test it is expected that GMTE and PROB may provide the
most accurate model and signiﬁcant results for advanced countries. In other
samples there is no such an assumption. Below we summarize the results.
The annual data ﬁt best to the regression including lagged 1 year
inﬂation rate, logged real gross domestic income (adjusted for terms of trade
changes) and prices of gasoline.
With this speciﬁcation, GMTO, GMTE and PROB have the strongest
explanatory power; the same signiﬁcant results are received when gasoline
is exchange for XRATE. GMTP appears to be signiﬁcant only when real
gross domestic income in original version, insigniﬁcant when logged. Similar
limits are observed for LVAU, which is signiﬁcant with gasoline, however
insigniﬁcant with XRATE. PROB has an expected positive sign and signiﬁ-
cant; better results of equation for gasoline, while TOR has a negative sign
with both XRATE and gasoline, however insigniﬁcant. Alesina proved to
have a negative sign and the result is signiﬁcant but equation’s ﬁt is worse
that with GMT measures. Similar results that Alesina have ES and BP.
CBIIndex has a negative sign (insigniﬁcant) with gasoline but positive one
11This rule will apply to all samples.
11(insigniﬁcant) with XRATE. Finally, adding POLITY2 to regression does
not bring signiﬁcant changes, except that some outcomes like for GMTO
are more signiﬁcant that previously. Real gross domestic income gives a
better ﬁt than growth of GDP per capita.
Data averaged to decades have the best ﬁt to regression including
POLITY2 and real gross domestic income.
When gasoline or XRATE included, speciﬁcations get worse; these vari-
ables are insigniﬁcant. Averaging limits periods to three, hence we do not
include lagged inﬂation rate. GMTO, GMTP, GMTE, all three have a neg-
ative and signiﬁcant sign. Both LVAU and TOR repeats previous results;
both are negative and insigniﬁcant. Alesina has a negative sign and signif-
icant but two explanatory variables are not signiﬁcant, adjusted R2 is low,
other tests of ﬁt are not good either. Similar results for BP and Distance,
while ES gives a bit better results than these two. CBIIndex doesn’t bring
any interesting, neither signiﬁcant results.
TSLS includes CBI measure, lagged inﬂation rate, and logged gross do-
mestic income. Instrument list: alternatively constant, XRATE, POLITY2,
UNEMP, DEFICIT/GDP.
The most important change is achieved with TOR, which, with this
regression method, is positive (hence as expected) and signiﬁcant, with ad-
justed R2 = 0.8. Moreover, again GMTP gave negative and signiﬁcant
results (the only one among GMT measures). Among other measures, only
PROB and ES resulted with expected signs (insigniﬁcant). Other mea-
sures had their coeﬃcients with a positive sign, insigniﬁcant results, lower
or rather low Durbin-Watson values.
Emerging markets An interesting group of countries appeared to be
the one including those, which are not yet advanced but at the same time
cannot be characterized with typical features known for poor, developing
states. The number of CBI measures constructed for emerging markets is
much more limited than for advanced ones. Here, in order to include large
sample (19), we have distinguished three measures: TOR, LVAU, and GMT.
Along with previous studies, we believe that TOR will be the best index,
since it carries elements of political in(stability). Additionally, we collect and
include (alternatively) few measures of democracy or political instability, like
LIEC, CHECKS, CONFLICT, or POLITY2. Similarly to other groups of
countries, we have built several models, looking for the best ﬁt. Previous
versions of this paper included growth of GDP, measure of openness, and
eﬀects of gasoline prices. This study reports the following results.
• The annual data ﬁt best to the regression including lagged 1 year
inﬂation rate, LIEC, and growth of GDP per capita
– Among political measures only LIEC brought some explanatory
12value and results were signiﬁcant. Neither POLITY2, nor other
measures mattered.
– Additionally it was better to include growth of GDP than real
gross domestic income. We did not modify the dependent variable
by using logarithms due to very large negative values.
– TOR reported expected positive and signiﬁcant values of coeﬃ-
cients. Diﬀerently to previous versions of this paper, as well as to
some other studies, we have obtained a negative and signiﬁcant
sign of coeﬃcient for LVAU (total panel (unbalanced) observa-
tions: 425). In this case speciﬁcations of the regression were
rather good, with relatively high adjusted R2. The coeﬃcient for
GMT had a negative sign but the result was insigniﬁcant.
– Including a depreciation of money value as a dependent variable
resulted with a rather poor model, only 0.001% of adjusted R2,
and other diagnostics much worse than in previous versions of the
model.
• Decennial data, built on averages, eliminate some information that’s
why we expect to receive diﬀerent outcomes. Originally we can distin-
guish 3 periods (with the last period shorter than 10 years). However,
in the process of ﬁtting the data to the model, we have decided to add
lagged one period gasoline prices, and hence we end up with 2 periods
and 18 cross-sections. Additionally, the model includes measure of po-
litical instability CONFLICT (alternatively with gasoline) and growth
of GDP per capita.
– Among three measures, this time only TOR resulted with ex-
pected sign (positive) and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Coeﬃcient for
CONFLICT is insigniﬁcant, and eliminating it brings better re-
gression diagnostics. However, it causes increase in Durbin-Watson
value (up to 2.6). Replacing TOR with LVAU causes loss of sig-
niﬁcance for the CBI coeﬃcient. LVAU has a negative sing but
otherwise the model looses on its ﬁt. Surprisingly, we were able
to receive signiﬁcant results for GMT. Even bigger surprise was
to receive at the same time a positive (in contrast to expected)
sign for this coeﬃcient.
The summary of results written above prove that TOR does ﬁt the best
for less developed countries. However, signiﬁcance of LVAU also shows that,
along the passing time and better economic results, this group of countries
moves towards institutional design of industrial nations. Modiﬁcation of the
data by averaging to periods proves our assumption of receiving contradic-
tory results.
13Transition countries For this sample of countries, we performed and
report the estimation results both for original and periodical data (similarly
to emerging markets). Due to the institutional changes during the transition
time, two periods have been distinguished for transition countries, where
years 1997-1998 are used as dividers. The ﬁrst period is unequal for some
countries due to their late (later than 1990) creation, as well as problems
with obtaining reliable statistics since the beginning.
Former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have
been under greater investigation in recent years, hence a larger number of
CBI measures constructed for this sample. We were able to run here a
PCA analysis, which among nine measures (LVAW, LVES, GMTE, GMTP,
GMTE, TOR, TORMAS, OI, CBIDF) extracted three factors12:
• one focusing around legal measures (FAC1)
• one for turnovers of governors (FAC2)
• and one for two other measures, which construction method, and hence
focus they laid on, was diﬀerent from legal measures (FAC3).
When included in the model, only FAC1 reported signiﬁcant results,
resulting with a negative sign of coeﬃcient.
Our supposition that the modiﬁcation of data by averaging can bring
diﬀerent results is well seen in this example. It is hard to make a decision
whether LVES (legal measure) and TOR (actual independence) describe the
data better than measures by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, which are
signiﬁcant in the second experiment.
Developing markets We were not able to obtain any signiﬁcant and
reliable results for developing countries. The reasons of this may be of
course our inability of ﬁnding the best regression equation. We have tried
many modiﬁcations, including deﬁning the dependent variable as the change
of inﬂation ∆π =
πn−πn−1
πn−1 , and choosing diﬀerent control variables as seen
below:




+β4XRATE + β5DEFi,t + ǫi,t (1)
With such a model, TOR proved being a good explanatory variable.
However, we have tried to modify this regression with other variables like the
price of gasoline and conﬂict, instead of checks, as well as use diﬀerencing
for the dependent variable. Neither of these transformations worked well
enough to report results in this study.
12Varimax, Kaiser 0.664
143.4 Additional statistical tests
3.4.1 Extracting factors
Having an adequate number of CBI measures, we performed several Princi-
pal Component Analysis tests aiming to extract factors. Number and type
of measures included in the analysis was determined by Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy (KMO)13. Factors received by rotating with
Varimax; factors scores obtained with the Anderson-Rubin method.
Advanced countries When included both Alesina and ES indices, along
with ”standard”package of measures, The KMO test manages to reach 0.613.
However, due to short time series for two ﬁrst mentioned measures, this
analysis covers only 37 observations. Excluding them, and thus increasing
the number of observations results in the signiﬁcant decline in the KMO test
(0.474).
The ﬁrst extraction brings three factors. We would expect exact division
between legal and non-legal factors but due to a larger number of statute-
reading based measures, a legal factor is divided into two parts. Hence, one
factor (FAC1) included indices Alesina and LVAU, placing them however on
the opposite side in the plot (Alesina with a negative sign); FAC2 consists
of the remaining measures that is GMTP, GMTO and ES (all with the same
sign); ﬁnally FAC3 reminds a typical non-legal measure including TOR and
CBIPROB, however with a modiﬁcation of GMTE having an opposite sign
to two previous ones.
The second extraction, that is without Alesina and ES, brings two fac-
tors: FAC1 with LVAU, GMTO and GMTP, and FAC2 the same as previ-
ously. These two factors performs relatively well in the test with decennial
data. The ﬁrst factor shows negative and signiﬁcant relationship with inﬂa-
tion, the second one shows also a negative but insigniﬁcant one.
Transition countries We were able to receive the highest value of the
KMO test(0.664) for a group of indices including: LVAW, LVES, three mea-
sures of GMT, TOR, TORMAS, OI, and CBI-DF. It resulted with the ex-
traction of three factors: one including all legal measures, second combining
two measures of actual independence, and third one with just one measure
CBI-DF.
3.4.2 Stepwise selection
Using statistical applications, we have performed a regression using step-
wise selection method. We have decided to include only CBI indices as
13The KMO statistic varies between 0 and 1, for values closer to 0 indicating very poor
sampling, and close to 1 superb sampling choice. See Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999),
”The multivariate social scientist”.
15explanatory variables. We are aware of drawbacks that this method carries,
hence we treat it as an additional supplementary test. It is also necessary to
mention that we have recorded high partial correlations between few mea-
sures. Our method criteria was based on probability of entering F≤0.50,
and probability of removing from regression F≥ 0.100.
At ﬁrst, we have included all available for us measures but some of them
were not accepted by the programme. Eliminating few, which have not
performed well in previous regressions, we ended our selection to 3 (5) the
most important and most discussed indices: three measures by GMT, LVAU
and TOR.14
Advanced countries In the test based on annual data, the only regres-
sor included was GMTE, however diagnostics of regression were very low:
adjusted R2 reached 0.025, D-W=0.4. Then, we turned into decennial data,
having in mind it brought interesting results in previous analysis. This time,
we could also include 2 factors, extracted in the PCA analysis (one for legal,
and one for nonlegal attributes). Here we started from including also mea-
sure by Alesina and ES, keeping in mind they were calculated just once and
for limited number of countries. In the ﬁrst analysis (with number of obser-
vations equals 15), Alesina appeared to be the stronger regressor. R2=0.613,
D-W= 1.578.
Since as noticed, previous test limited us to 15 observations, we repeated
it excluding Alesina and ES, staying with N=40 (still keeping factors in).
The result was not very surprising. We received 3 regressors this time GMTE
(again), GMTO and LVAU. However, while both GMT measures had very
strong signiﬁcant and negative sign of coeﬃcients, the same for LVAU ap-
peared to be positive.
Our ﬁnal trial for advanced countries focused only on ﬁve major indices,
excluding those extracting with PCA. Again, we used decennial data and
were able to include 43 observations. The pattern has repeated also in this
test. The only variable chosen was GMTE, with adjusted R2 equal 0.342,
and diagnostics for Durbin-Watson being low, 0.985.
Transition countries Apart from ”standard”package of CBI indices, we
were able to ﬁnd other original measures, as well as extract from this group
three factors. It gave us a number of 14 measures, adding ﬁrst the measure by
Freytag and Masciandaro (FM), new values of TOR, and three factors, hence
starting with N=40. Stepwise selection entered four variables into regression,
with somewhat surprising signs of coeﬃcients: FAC1 (neg.), GMTO (pos.),
GMTE (neg.), and LVAW (pos.). Next, eliminating FM, our number of
observations rose to 80, including to the regression three variables mentioned
above, with the same signs (GMTE was not included this time). Finally, we
14Selected results are reported in the Appendix
16have also excluded factors, and left the group of ”standard” CBI measures
(three GMTs, LVES, LVAW, and twice TOR), which helped us to raise the
number of observation signiﬁcantly up to 210. This time, only measures of
”actual” independence were included: TOR and TORMAS, of which only
TORMAS ‘produced’ expected positive sign. Finally, repeating the same
test for periodical data, we obtained the same outcome as previously.
4 Who is the winner? - conclusions...
The major goal of this paper, choosing the most adequate CBI deﬁnition,
is done by the empirical veriﬁcation of the impact that each index has on
the economy. The value added of this work is gathering and comparison
of several various measures of central bank independence. The theoretical
discussion on their precision did not bring the consensus and did not point
the optimal design for central banks. Thus, this study reaches for empirical
methods in order to point the “winner”.
We have faced many drawbacks since the beginning of the study. All
samples are of very diﬀerent patterns when macroeconomic variables are
concerned. Starting from the dependent variable, it is not clear whether
simple annual change of inﬂation rate is ‘good’ enough for the model, or
the depreciation rate introduced by Cukierman et al. (1992) should be used
here. We were not able to ﬁnd a model that would suit all the data. We
found that the modiﬁcation of the frequency of the data may change the
ﬁnal outcome.
Table 2: Summary of results for advanced and transition countries.
ADVANCED COUNTRIES
TEST OLS-annual OLS-period Stepwise-annual Stepwise-period
Expected, GMT *3 GMT*3 GMTE GMTE(3)
Signiﬁcant PROB, BP, ES Alesina, BP Alesina GMTO(3)








Expected FAC1 GMTO, GMTP FAC1(1,2) TORMAS(4)




Signiﬁcant LVAW (1,2), TOR(3) TOR(4)
Unexpected LVES
Insigniﬁcant LVAW
Notes: Numbers in brackets stand for the number of regression.
We are summarizing the results in the table 2. We indicate a type of the
17sample, the frequency of the data, whether the result was expected at the
beginning of the study, and if this result was signiﬁcant.
4.1 Choosing the best
Regardless all problems, the group of advanced countries is the strongest
example that the process of disinﬂation has been accompanied by increas-
ing degree of central bank independence in many countries. Long 36 years
period, several changes in the degree of CBI with the upward trend and,
despite ﬁnancial turbulences at the beginning of the 1990s, decreasing inﬂa-
tion rate, this all prove to be signiﬁcant in the search for a negative relation
between CBI and inﬂation.
Based on this report, we would point to the measure constructed by
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini as the “winner” in this selection. The
commonly accepted as the right one, legal index LVAU (or LVAW), has
failed to explain the change in inﬂation in some tests. The main diﬀerence
between LVAU and GMT is weighting method. The former distinguishes dif-
ferent importance of CBs’ attributes, whereas the latter gives equal number
of points to all of them. Perhaps, this second option eliminates researcher’s
arbitrariness, makes the measure more objective and this way, more univer-
sal.
4.2 Do diﬀerences in legal proxies matter
The analysis performed by Cukierman (1992), which led him to the conclu-
sion mentioned in the introductory part of this study, is one of the most
inﬂuential in the history of studies on CBI and its relations with inﬂation.
At the moment of his study, a limited number of CBI measures was available.
One of our aims in this paper was to challenge an opinion that diﬀerences
in regression results would be mainly caused by diﬀerences in institutional
development of countries, rather than variations in legal proxies of CBI. With
considerably long time series and large cross-country data, as well as varying
tests, we were able at least to hint the thought of contradictory results given
by ”competing” CBI measures within the same sample. While legal proxies
by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini performed in the majority of tests for
advanced countries as expected, other failed to prove their signiﬁcance.
4.3 Ways of receiving preferred results
In this experiment, we have observed that data on CBI is vulnerable to data
modiﬁcations. Averaging time-series from annual to periodical causes signif-
icant loss of information for some countries followed by the loss of signiﬁcant
relations, and at the same time leads to obtaining diﬀerent outcomes.
Opposite signs received for measures of turnover ensured us with our
assumption that this measure depends a lot on other factors than those con-
18cerning central banks. Due to its composition, a fraction with a changing
period (months, years) in the denominator, it is possible to obtain contradic-
tory results for the same country within a very short period of time. Hence,
in a stepwise selection method, we could obtain varying (opposite) results
for the same (by deﬁnition) measure, with a moment of measurement being
diﬀerent.
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21A Measures, their authors and description
1. BP - Bade and Parkin (1988) - Focus on three main criteria: (1) rela-
tionship between a central bank and a government in the formulation
of monetary policy; (2) procedures in appointing the board of the cen-
tral bank; (3) ﬁnancial aid and budgetary relations between the central
bank and the government.
2. Alesina - Alesina (1988, 1989) - Similar to BP and additional interest
if the central bank is not required to absorb the excess supply of short
term treasury bills.
3. GMT - Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) - GMT introduces
deﬁnitions of political (GMTP) and economic (GMTE) independence.
The ﬁrst one is determined by (1) procedure leading to appoint mem-
bers of the central bank board; (2) relationship between monetary
authorities and the government; (3) formal responsibilities of central
banks. Economic independence is described for example by (1) the
government’s ability to inﬂuence their amounts of borrowings from
the central bank or; (2) the nature of monetary instruments, which
remain under control of the central bank.
4. LVAU - Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) - Based on
sixteen CB attributes divided into four clusters, relating to (1) ap-
pointment, dismissal, and term of oﬃce of the chief executive oﬃcer
of the bank (CEO); (2) policy formulation and resolution of conﬂicts
between the executive branch and the CB; (3) objectives of the central
bank; and (4) legal restrictions on the ability of the central bank to
lend to the public sector.
5. TOR and VUL - Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992) -
Turnover rate of governors and the measure of vulnerability have been
called the ‘actual’ independence indices. The ﬁrst one decides on the
degree of CBI based on the turnover (change) on the CEO post. The
latter provides more sensitive analysis looking at the probability of
dismissing a central bank governor shortly after a political change of
the government.
6. TORMAS - turnover of governors updated for transition countries
(Maslowska, 2007, unpublished).
7. ES - Eijﬃnger and Schaling (1993) - This measure focuses on criteria
concerning (1) the central bank being a sole ﬁnal monetary authority
or being one of many subjects deciding on the monetary policy; (2)
presence of the government authority in the bank board; (3) indepen-
dent (or non) procedures of the board’s members.
228. Distance - Fratianni and Huang (1994) - The measure is constructed
based on nine diﬀerent measures of CBI and their arithmetic mean.
The German Bundesbank being the benchmark with the value of unity,
the values for other measures were calculated using the following for-
mula: distance=
p
(average − 1)2 − variance
9. CBI-Index - Freytag and Masciandaro (2005) - The CBI index is the
aggregate of eight of the twelve components of the monetary commit-
ment index index.
10. OPCBI-N - Eijﬃnger and Schaling (1995) - The optimal degree of CBI
(normalized) as explained by by the NAIRU, the number of years that
a left-wing (socialist) party has been in government, variance of output
growth, and the ratio between the compensation of employees paid by
resident producers to resident housholds and GDP.
11. PROB - Krause and M´ endez (2007) - A measure of CBI that incorpo-
rates the probability that there will be a turnover in the central bank
governor following a government change.
12. CBI-DF - Loungani and Sheets (1997) construct their index by com-
bining elements of the GMT index considering Debelle and Fisher
methodology. CBI-DF is formulated on the basis of Debelle and Fis-
cher (1994) work that attributes equal weights on goal and economic
independence
13. SIB - (Loungani and Sheets, 1997) - formulated by evaluating the
similarity of attributes between a given central bank and the German
Bundesbank.
14. OI - overall independence (Maliszewski, 2000), measure by GMT mod-
iﬁed with two factors, which refer to provisions for governor’s dismissal
as non-political only (political independence) and consider whether all
direct credit is securitised (economic independence).
23Attribute/Measure BP Alesina ES GMT Legal FM LS Rank
Policy responsibility 2
* is CB the sole ﬁnal policy authority • • • • • •
* is this authority entrusted to the CB alone • • • •
* is it entrudted to G • • •
* is CB given an active role in formulation of the G’s budget •
Presence of the G’s representative in the CB’s board • • • •
* does he has a vote •
* does he has a veto power •
CEO and board appointment 4
*CEO not appointed by the G • • •
* length of CEO appointment • • • 5
* CEO allowed to hold other oﬃce •
* CEO an expert •
* more than half of the board appointed independently • • • •
*none of the board appointed by the G • •
* length of board appointment • •
Financial and budgetary relations between CB and G 6
* direct credit facility not automatic • • •
* DCF is at the market interest rate • •
* DCF is temporary • • •
* DCF is of limited amount • • • •
* CB does not participate in the primary market • • •
* discount rate is set by the CB • •
* circle of potential borrowers •
* who decides control of terms of lending •
Conﬂict resolution rules • • • • 3
Responsibilities for commercial banks supervision •
Locus of legal commitment • • •
Accountability of the CB •
CB controls monetary instruments • 1
Table 3: Similarities in measures
Notes: BP-Bade and Parkin, ES-Eijﬃnger and Schaling, GMT-Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini, Legal-Cukierman,
FM-Freytag and Masciandaro, LS-Loungani and Sheets, Rank-Frey et al.B List of variables
1. Inﬂation - average consumer prices, annual percent change (World Eco-
nomic Outlook Database for October 2007).
2. Growth rate of Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series),
unit: % in 2000 Constant Prices. (PWT, 6.2)
3. Real Gross Domestic Income (RGDPL adjusted for Terms of Trade
changes), unit: I$ terms of trade in 2000 Constant Prices. The RGDPTT
variable is Gross Domestic Income and follows the recommended method
in the UN System of National Accounts. (PWT, 6.2)
4. XRATE - historical exchange rate regimes (IMF publications and
Reinhart C.M., and K.S. Rogoﬀ, The Modern History of Exchange
Rate Arrangements: a Reinterpretation, NBER Working Paper, No.
8963, 2002.)
5. xrate - Exchange Rate, unit: US=1 in General Variables (PWT, 6.2)
6. Openness in Current Prices, unit: % in Current Prices. Exports plus
Imports divided by GDP is the total trade as a percentage of GDP. The
export and import ﬁgures are in national currencies from the World
Bank and United Nations data archives. (PWT, 6.2)
7. Openness in Constant Prices, unit: % in 2000 Constant Prices. Ex-
ports plus Imports divided by RGDPL. This is the constant price
equivalent of the OPENC variable and is the total trade as a per-
centage of GDP. (PWT, 6.2)
8. Government general balance as a percent of GDP (World Economic
Outlook Database for October 2007).
9. Unemployment rate - Percent of total labor force ((World Economic
Outlook Database for October 2007).
10. Oil - Reﬁner Acquisition Cost of Imported Crude Oil (IRAC) (nominal
us dollars). (Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov)
11. Gasoline - Retail Gasoline Price, cents/gallon, cpiu adjusted (Energy
Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov).
12. CONFLICT - The weighted conﬂict index is calculated in the following
manner: Multiply the value of the number of Assassinations by 24,
General Strikes by 43, Guerrilla Warfare by 46, Government Crises by
48, Purges by 86, Riots by 102, Revolutions by 148, Anti-Government
Demonstrations by 200. Sum the 8 weighted values and divide by 9.
The result is the value (with decimal) stored as the Weighted Conﬂict
Index. (http://library.trincoll.edu/timeseries/)
2513. LIEC - Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competitiveness
(Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Deﬁnitions,
Philip Keefer, Development Research Group, The World Bank Issued:
July 2005)
14. CHECKS - Checks and balances (Database of Political Institutions:
Changes and Variable Deﬁnitions, Philip Keefer, Development Re-
search Group, The World Bank Issued: July 2005)
15. POLITY2 - POLITY IV PROJECT, Political Regime Characteristics
and Transitions, 1800-2006, Center for Global Policy School of Pub-
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26C Correlation coeﬃcients and selected results from
estimations
Table 4: Simple correlation coeﬃcients for a group of advanced countries
Measure GMTE GMTP GMTO LVAU TOR BP ALESINA ES PROB
GMTE 1 0,326* 0,791** 0,562** 0,018 0,425 0,574* 0,210 -0,464**
GMTP 0,181 1 0,781** 0,766** 0,00 0,440 0,571* 0,492* -0,207
GMTO 0,584** 0,626** 1 0,849** 0,23 0,554 0,665** 0,407 -0,359*
LVAU 0,391** 0,597** 0,651** 1 0,068 0,682* 0,664** 0,560* -0,111
TOR -0,017 -0,120 0,25 0,059 1 0,256 -0,40 -0,165 0,383*
BP 0,387 0,298 0,403 0,340 0,224 1 1,00** 0,824** -0,198
ALESINA 0,507* 0,373 0,513* 0,395 -0,062 1,00** 1 0,628* -0,031
ES 0,140 0,271 0,263 0,269 -0,088 0,702** 0,430 1 -0,432
PROB -0,329** -0,154 -0,230 -0,103 0,294* -0,245 0,00 -0,434*1
Notes: Upper part Pearson’s, lower part Kendall’s nonparametric coeﬃcients.
Correlation is signiﬁcant at the: ** - 0,01 level, * - 0,05 level.
Table 5: Results of regressions - for advanced countries (OLS: annual | periodical |
TSLS
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (1) (4) (5) (2) (6)
Constant 14.17** 12.05* 7.36* 21.12*** 113.788** -32.22 -48.66** -41.99**
CBI -1.37** -1.89* 1.34** -6.67*** -1.2** -2.58** 1.58 7.75*
π(-1) 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.769*** 1.06*** 1.19*** 1.09***
logRGDI -1.49** -1.23* -0.92** -8.74*** 3.345* 4.66** 4.056**
GAS 0.01*** 0.014*** 0.013***
POLITY2 -0.22** -2.24
RGDI -0.0005***
N.Obs. 748 748 500 63 40 522 522 522
Adj. R2 0.78 0.78 0.86 0.74 0.64 0.79 0.77 0.81
D-W 2.09 2.08 1.588 1.82 1.2 1.478 1.57 1.66
Notes: where CBI≡(1) GMTO, (2) GMTE, (3) PROB, (4) FAC1, (5) GMTP, (6) TOR
(*), (**), (***) - signiﬁcant at the level of 0,1; 0,05; 0,001 respectively
Table 6: Results of OLS regressions - for emerging markets (annual | periods)
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (3) (5)
Constant -132.99** 8.27 71.33** 149.65** 53.35 -330.6* 205.1** -359.9*
CBI 262.82*** 220.58*** -115.8* -141.69* -119.09 403.1*** -60.3 257.2**
π(-1) 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.457*** 0.45*** 0.46***
LIEC 21.7** 12.72* 14.08
POLITY2 3.57 5.29*
CONFLICT -0.223
GDPG -21.02* -21.23* -23.95** -24.43** -23.77** -29.6* -41.42** -31.1
GAS(-1) 1.76* 1.74*
N.Obs. 422 398 425 401 436 36 54 38
Adj. R2 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.275 0.27 0.28 0.107 0.12
D-W 1.988 1-99 2-02 2.02 2.018 2.6 1.788 2.14
Notes: where CBI≡(1,2) TOR, (3,4) LVAU, (5) GMT
(*), (**), (***) - signiﬁcant at the level of 0,1; 0,05; 0,001 respectively
27Table 7: Results of OLS regressions - for transition countries (annual | periods)
Regressor (1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.67 2.14** 0.66**




GDPG -0.987** -0.09*** -0.08**
N.Obs. 69 42 34
Adj. R
2 0.49 0.42 0.51
D-W 2.14 2.14 1.46
Notes: where CBI≡(1) FAC1, (2) GMTO, (3) TORMAS
(*), (**), (***) - signiﬁcant at the level of 0,1; 0,05; 0,001 respectively
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